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Abstract
We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows
us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players'
valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less
support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.
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In this note we report results from an experiment designed to test whether
subjective valuations of a prisoners’ dilemma coincide with Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs. This apparently straightforward consequence of individual ratio-
nality plays a central role in game theory, being especially useful in the
determination of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.1 Our results suggest that
subjective game valuations might diﬀer from Nash equilibrium payoﬀsd e -
pending on the utility (or disutility) which individuals experience from being
involved in a strategic interaction.
In our experiment, players face a symmetric 2x2 prisoners’ dilemma and a
set of alternative outside options. Apart from a subject’s actual behavior, we
are interested in the value he or she assigns to the game. Thus, before playing
the game, subjects make binary decisions between their future earnings in
t h eg a m ea n das e r i e so fﬁxed payoﬀs. This elicitation method allows us to
obtain the subjective valuation of the game, which otherwise would remain
unknown. Apart from the frequency of dominant strategy (DS) adoption, we
study the correlation between DS play and subjects’ subjective valuations.
Finally, we use players’ scores in Raven’s (1976) non verbal intelligence test
to assess whether non-DS play and discrepancies between subjective game
valuations and Nash equilibrium payoﬀs are related to poor decision-making
abilities.
We ﬁnd that, contrary to the prediction that subjective game valuations
coincide with the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, almost half of our subjects either
under- or over-valuate the prisoners’ dilemma implemented here.2 Such devi-
ations are weakly related with a lower percentage of Dominant Strategy (DS)
play, which nevertheless, receives systematic support by our results. While
no correlation is found between scores in Raven’s (1976) non verbal intel-
ligence test and elicited game values, the frequency of dominated strategy
play negatively correlates with subjects’ scores in the aforementioned test.
1See, for example, seminal papers by Selten (1975) and Kreps and Wilson (1982).
2Early experimental studies by Flood (1952), Lave (1962) and Rapoport and Chammah
(1965) have reported results on behavior in prisoners’ dilemma games, but the issue of game
valuation has not been isolated from behavior itself.
12 Experimental Design
The results reported here were obtained from a single experimental session at
the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental at the Universitat Jaume I (Castel-
lón, Spain). Participants (N=66) were undergraduate students of Business
Administration . Before participating in the main experiment, subjects were
faced with Raven’s psychometric test of non verbal intelligence, considered
by psychologists as a good predictor of performance in decision making tasks.
Subjects were informed that all their monetary rewards would be calculated
on the basis of their performance in the main experiment alone.
The main experiment is based on the following two-stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, which is labelled as a proposal to merge with one’s opponent, play-
ers choose strategies from the pair {M,NM} ({“Merger”, “No Merger”}). A
merger takes place if both players simultaneously propose to merge (M)a n d
the game is over. Then, both players earn X Euros, for which 7 alternative
values are used in a payment card, incentive-compatible elicitation format,
where X ∈ {25,19,17.5,16.8,15.8,15,10}. Otherwise, players enter into the
second-stage decision, which is labelled as a game of reciprocal entry into
each other’s market. Each subject chooses a strategy from {E,NE} ({“En-
try”, “No Entry”}).3 The payoﬀso ft h i ss u b g a m ea r eg i v e ni nt h ef o l l o w i n g
matrix:




Entry 17 , 17 22 , B
No Entry B , 22 18 , 18
Two diﬀerent values of B were used: A relatively high (B =1 2 .5)a n d
a relatively low one (B =1 ). In both cases, this subgame’s payoﬀsy i e l da
prisoner’s dilemma whose dominant strategy equilibrium leads to a reciprocal
entry by both players into each other’s market. Observe that the 7 values
of X, corresponding to the merger, range from well above to well below the
value of individual payoﬀs in the DS equilibrium.
3Written and oral instructions with detailed information about the game, payoﬀs, earn-
ings and tasks to be performed were given to subjects. We also answered questions and
gave examples to solve any remaining doubts. Instructions are available upon request.
2We have used the strategy method, asking subjects to simultaneously post
their strategies in both subgames, for each one of the 14 scenarios resulting
from the combinations between each one of the 7 values of X and the two
values of B.4
Once strategies were posted, one of the 14 scenarios was randomly chosen
t ob et h eb i n d i n go n e . F i n a l l y ,3 3p a i r so fs u b j e c t sw e r er a n d o m l yf o r m e d
and each one’s payoﬀ was determined according to the two players’ strategies
in the chosen scenario.
3H y p o t h e s e s a n d R e s u l t s
Our results are based on two types of observations. First, a subject’s min-
imum value of X for which he/she prefers the merger to the earnings of
the entry subgame. These data are labelled as the subjective value of the
entry subgame. Second, subjects’ strategies in the entry subgame. We la-
bel data generated under the 2 diﬀerent values of B using the term “sub-
series”(B=12.5: “ﬁrst subseries”, B=1: “second subseries”).
Our hypotheses are the following:
H1: Subjects will “switch” from NM to M at the lowest value of X
exceeding 17.
Subsequently, we will refer to subjective entry-subgame valuations devi-
ating from this pattern as under- (over-)valuations, depending on whether
subjects switch to the merger for a lower (higher) X than that postulated in
H1.
H2: Subjects’ elicited valuations of the entry subgame should remain in-
variant across diﬀerent values of the dominated strategy payoﬀ.
That is, within-subject comparison of strategies in the merger subgame
should not exhibit signiﬁcant diﬀerences across subseries.
H3: In the entry subgame, subjects will play the dominant strategy (E).
We classify subjects into three groups according to their decisions in the
merger subgame. Group 2 consists of those who adopt the merger for all
4The corresponding 14 screens were presented to the subjects in a random sequence
-diﬀerent for each subject-, in order for ordering eﬀects to be avoided.
3the values of X strictly exceeding Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the entry sub-
game (17) and for only them, that is X ∈ {25,19,17.5}.G r o u p 1 c o n s i s t s
of subjects proposing the merger for a strict subset of the aforementioned
values, implying an overvaluation of the entry subgame. Analogously, group
3 consists of subjects willing to merge for a broader spectrum of values of X
than the aforementioned ones, including values lying below Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs in the entry subgame. In Table II we present the percentages of sub-
jects that are included in each group, for each one of the two subseries. For
each group, we also include the percentage of subjects playing the dominant
strategy, E.
Table II: Distribution of Elicited Values and Percentage of DS Play
Subseries 1 (B=12.5) Subseries 2 (B=1)
%o fE %o fE
Group 1 (over) 22.7% 84.76% 9.1% 75.24%
Group 2 (DS Eq.) 51.5% 96.16% 57.6% 91.13%
Group 3 (under) 25.8% 73.28% 33.3% 81.30%
Observe in Table II that H1 is conﬁrmed by only (approximately) 50% of
the subjects. The rest of them “overvaluate” or “undervaluate” the game and
the percentage of the former signiﬁcantly5decreases (from 22.7% to 9.11%)
in the presence of a lower dominated strategy payoﬀ6, implying a violation
of H2.
Let us move now to strategies adopted in the game of entries. Aggregat-
ing decisions in the game of entries, around 85% of them conﬁrm H3.I n
fact, 73% of the subjects have played the dominant strategy in all scenarios.
From table II we can see that the highest frequencies (respectively, 96.16%
and 91.13%) of dominant strategy play coincides (for both subseries) with
the population of subjects whose valuation of the game is equal to Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs. However, no signiﬁcant correlation7was found between
strategies in the game of entries and elicited values. Interestingly, we ﬁnd a
5AW i l c o x o n( p =0 .018)a n das i g nt e s t( p =0 .017)c o n ﬁrm this result at a signiﬁcance
level α =0 .05
6This is an aggregate result, while within-subject examination indicates that a small
percentage (5%) of subjects shifted across scenarios on the opposite direction.
7Both Spearman and Pearson correlation coeﬃcients were non signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level
of signiﬁcance.
4positive correlation (Spearman’s ρ =0 .316,α=0 .05) between a subject’s
performance in Raven’s test and the number of scenarios in which the sub-
ject has played the dominant strategy. This may imply that not choosing
the dominant strategy in the game of entries may be simply the result of a
low capacity in decision making tasks. On the contrary, no correlation was
found between scores in Raven’s test and merger decisions, implying that
the reported over- and under-valuations of the subgame of entries cannot be
simply attributed to the subjects’ low decision-making abilities.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
We have reported an experiment designed to test whether human subjects’
valuations of a prisoners’ dilemma game coincide (as assumed, for example,
when backward induction is used to obtain a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium)
with subjects’ Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. The hypothesis is contradicted by
approximately half of our subjects. Subjects conﬁrming the predicted valua-
tion exhibit higher frequencies of dominant strategy play, which is conﬁrmed
by the majority of our subjects. Finally, dominated strategy play signiﬁ-
cantly correlates with low scoring in Raven’s (1976) non verbal intelligence
test.
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